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RECENT DECISIONS
the joint venture will now be less able to provide large scale in-
dustry with a means to effect the concentration of large amounts
of capital and the concurrent reduction of competition. Since it
might no longer be possible to concentrate capital to the degree
that was hitherto permissible, the joint venture will now be less
able to reduce financial risk and aid in the achievement of economies
of scale.35 And since prior to this decision this type of enterprise
was subject only to the restrictions of Section 1 of the Sherman
Act, the joint venture will now be less able to minimize the risk
of governmental interference with anti-competitive activities. Now,
although different in form and organization, the merger and the
joint venture will be subject to similar control. Hence, a corpor-
ation will undoubtedly prefer to merge with an already established
corporation, rather than to form an entirely new one via a joint
venture.
Moreover, it appears that this decision will have a restrictive
effect upon all types of business combinations regardless of whether
they were formerly subject to section 7. By stating that "the test
of the section is the effect of the acquisition," the Court appears
to be requiring only an anti-competitive potential in order to apply
the restrictions of the Clayton Act. Thus, the Penn-Olin decision
apparently tolls the death knell for any combination that might
restrict competition, irrespective of the organizational attributes of
the enterprise.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES CONTROL ACT
-SECTION 6 HELD INVALID AS INFRINGEMENT OF FIFTH AMNEND-
MENT GUARANTEE OF RIGHT TO TRAVEL. - Appellants' passports
were revoked by the Department of State because it was believed
that their use of the passports would violate Section 6 of the
Subversive Activities Control Act.'
This statute makes it unlawful for a member of any organ-
ization required to register with the Subversive Activities Control
Board to (1) make application for a passport or the renewal
35 Economies of scale are found in industries where technical conditions
may lead to increasing returns to scale, i.e., where output is ex-
panded average costs of production fall. The reasons for this situation are
(1) the advantage of increased specialization, e.g., assembly line tech-
nique, and (2) technical indivisibility of input, e.g., feasibility of making
large scale capital investment only where there is a large scale capacity.
SNIDER, EcoNomIcs, PRINCIPLES AND IssuEs 409-14 (1962).
164 Stat. 993 (1950), as amended, 68 Stat. 778, 50 U.S.C. § 785 (1954).
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thereof, or (2) use or attempt to use any such passport. Appellants
filed separate complaints in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia for declaratory and injunctive relief,
alleging a violation of their constitutional rights. On direct appeal
the Supreme Court reversed the district court and held that section
6 was an unconstitutional restriction of the appellants' right to
travel as guaranteed by the fifth amendment. Aptheker v. Secretary
of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
The first legal expression of the right to travel was contained
in the Magna Carta.2 Subsequently, individuals traveled freely
merely using a passport as a letter of introduction to foreign
nationals. 3  This right to travel freely was incorporated into the
United States Constitution as part of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments. 4  In the early nineteenth century a passport assumed
its traditional role as a mere letter of introduction identifying the
traveler as a United States citizen. At this time any governmental
executive could issue such letters, since they were not required
for purposes of entry or exit. However, in order to centralize
and make more uniform the issuance of passports, Congress, in
1856, vested the power of issuance solely in the Secretary of
State.5  The passport, however, still remained informative in
nature and, therefore, the State Department was liberal in its
issuance.6
The United States Supreme Court first upheld the right of
free travel in 1867 in the case of Crandall v. Nevada.7  The Court
prohibited a state tax on government troops crossing Nevada
territory and declared that the right of free travel applied not only
to the Government but also to the individual as well. Thi in-
dividual's right remained unrestricted until the outbreak of world
hostilities in 1918, when Congress recognized the need to restrict
travel for security purposes. Under its war powers it enacted
a statute which enabled the President to prohibit exit from the
United States without a valid passport.8  Thus, the enabling
statute marked the initial transition of a passport from a merely
informative document to an actual license to travel. With the
return to normalcy, however, Congress amended the prior peace-
time statute, thereby reaffirming the discretionary powers that
2 Magna Carta, ch. 42 (1215).
3 Comment, Passport Refusal for Political Reasons: Constituthonal Issues
and Judicial Review, 61 YALE L.J. 171 (1952).
4 Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 163 (1941).
511 Stat. 60 (1856), as amended, 44 Stat. 887, 22 U.S.C. § 211(a)(1926).
63 MooRE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST § 493, at 862 (1906).
7 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 44 (1867).
8 40 Stat. 559, 22 U.S.C. § 223 (1918). The enabling statute was invoked
by presidential proclamation in 1918 and subsequently revoked in 1921.
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had been exercised by the Secretary of State with regard to the
issuance of passports.9  'Traditionally, the usual grounds for
denying issuance of a passport were non-citizenship or illegal
conduct.10 The discretionary power was upheld in 1939 when the
Supreme Court refused to issue a declaratory judgment or a writ
of mandamus interfering with the Secretary of State's discretion
concerning the issuance of passports.1
A new national emergency in 1941 necessitated a re-enactment
of the 1918 statute allowing the President to prohibit exit from the
United States without a valid passport. This presidential power
remains in force at present.' 2  In 1950 Congress enacted the
Internal Security Act,' 3 designed to prevent communists from
traveling abroad for the purpose of fostering subversive activities
in the United States.' 4  Unlike the statute allowing the President
to restrict exit of the entire citizenry in general, this act was aimed
at restricting a particular group of citizens. The act defined a
"communist organization" to mean any communist action or front
organization which is substantially controlled by a foreign govern-
ment and operates primarily to advance the objectives of the world
communist movement.' 5 The determination of whether an organ-
ization is subversive is to be made by the Subversive Activities
Control Board, upon application by the Attorney General.16
Once the organization is determined to be "communist" it is
required to register with the Attorney General, thereby precluding
any member of such organization from applying for or using a
passport.'7
The first major attack upon the power of the Secretary of
State to restrict a communist's travel was, however, not directed
at the Internal Security Act, but rather at the powers granted
to him under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 19521's
and the Passport Act of 1926.19 In Kent v. Dulles,20 an American
citizen was denied a passport because he was a communist who
944 Stat. 887, 22 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1926).
'
0 Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 127 (1958).
"'Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 (1939). Miss Elg, born in the United
States of Swedish parents, had her passport revoked by the State Department
on the ground that she was not an American citizen. The Court declared
her a citizen but refused to compel the Secretary of State to issue the
passport.
12 66 Stat. 163, 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (1952).
23 64 Stat. 993 (1950), as amended, 68 Stat. 778, 50 U.S.C. § 785 (1954).
14 1 U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 984-86 (1950).
IS2 U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 3893 (1950).
26 Ibid.
17 Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control
Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961).18 64 Stat. 993 (1950), as amended, 68 Stat. 778, 50 U.S.C. § 785 (1954).
1944 Stat. 887, 22 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1926).
20357 U.S. 116 (1958).
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urged adherence to the Communist Party line. He was informed
by the State Department that before a passport would issue he
would be required to submit an affidavit declaring whether he
had ever been a communist. This he refused to do. The Court
held that Congress had given no power to the Secretary of State
to compel such a declaration under either of the above-mentioned
acts. The Court noted that absent an express provision allowing
the Secretary to deny a passport, he must issue one. However,
the Court in Kent was concerned only with interpreting the express
powers granted by Congress and not with the extent of Congress'
constitutional powers to restrict travel.
In Aptheker v. Secretary of State 21 the Court was directly
confronted with the question of the constitutional limits of travel
restrictions necessitated by reasons of national security.22 In the
opinion of the majority, as expressed by Mr. Justice Goldberg,
Section 6 of the Subversive Activities Control Act, making it
illegal for all members of registered communist organizations to
use or attempt to use a passport, restricted too broadly a citizen's
constitutional right to travel freely. The Court indicated that
the desired ends of section 6 could be accomplished by "less
drastic" means.23 By a blanket restriction on all members of
registered communist organizations the Internal Security Act in
effect denies passports solely on the basis of political beliefs. In
addition, the statute provides that mere membership in a com-
munist organization is sufficient to preclude any legal use of a
passport, thereby creating a forfeiture of the constitutional right
to travel freely.2 4 The purpose of the act should be to restrict
only those who have already forfeited their right by actual sub-
versive activities, and not to impose a forfeiture on the basis of
mere membership.2 5
The majority opinion sets forth four basic requirements which
must be considered in order to produce a constitutional statute..
The first is knowledge. A person must have some knowledge
of the illegality of his activity before he should undergo a for-
feiture of his rights. For example, in Weiman v. Updegraff26
the Court struck down a state statute which enjoined payment of
salaries to state employees who refused to subscribe to a loyalty
21378 U.S. 500 (1964).
22 Id. at 505.23 Id. at 512-13. The Court did not specifically indicate what would
constitute "less drastic" means, but did refer to the case of American Com-
munications Ass'n v. Douds, 337 U.S. 382 (1949), wherein "less drastic"
means were used to prevent election of communist officers, without at the
same time affecting basic individual rights in regard to labor union member-
ship and the right to work.
24 Comment, supra note 3.
25 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
26 344 U.S. 183, 191 (1952).
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oath, reasoning that the indiscriminate classification of innocent
activity with knowing activity was an assertion of arbitrary power.
In American Communications Ass'n v. Douds2 7 the Court upheld
a labor act which required officers of labor organizations to file a
"non-communist" affidavit. In a separate opinion Mr. Justice
Jackson indicated that not only must there be knowledge of the
nature of one's acts, but there must also be sufficient evidence
of association to imply the conspiracy required for one to forfeit
his constitutional rights.
Next, it is necessary to consider the types of activity engaged
in by each party member. In Yates v. United States 28 the Court
reversed the convictions of two party members who allegedly
conspired to violate the Smith Act 2 9 This act makes it illegal
to advocate the overthrow of the United States Government by
force or violence. In reversing, the Court noted the distinction
between the passive acceptance of the philosophy or ideology of
communism and active participation in the communist conspiracy,
the latter being necessary to sustain a conviction.30  A similar
distinction was recognized in Sachtman v. United States.31 The
Court stated that it was an abuse of discretion for the Secretary
of State to deny a passport solely on the ground that the petitioner
was a member of a group on the Attorney General's list of sub-
versive organizations. 32
The third area of consideration is the commitment of the
member to the communist conspiracy. The fact that some members
of a group have evil or illegal purposes does not necessarily mean
that such is true of all.33  Furthermore, the degree of allegiance
men give to an organization is not usually unqualified and
unequivocal.34
The last consideration is the purpose and place of travel. It
would seem that Congress would be justified in concluding that
if subversives are allowed to travel freely to certain countries,
for unlawful purposes, the communist conspiracy would be
advanced.3 5
In not taking into consideration the above factors in the
formulation of section 6, Congress in effect authorized the State
Department to refuse passports solely on the ground of political
affiliation. It was this authority that the Supreme Court declared
27339 U.S. 382, 422-25 (1950).
-354 U.S. 298 (1957).
2918 U.S.C. § 2385 (1940).
soYates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 312-27 (1957).
31225 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1950).3 2 1d. at 940-44.
33 Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 246 (1957).
34 Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 136 (1943).
3 Comment, Passport Refusal for Political Reasons: Constitutional Issues
and Judicial Review, 61 YALE L.J. 171, 196 (1952).
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unconstitutional, for in restricting a person merely on these con-
siderations the State Department would be treating the issuance
of a passport as a privilege granted by the Government rather
than as a right of every American citizen.386
In order to constitutionally restrict a particular group of in-
dividuals we must follow the criteria set down in Aptheker. In
restricting those individuals who possess the requisite knowledge,
activity, commitment and purpose, we would in effect be restricting
only those individuals who are already restricted as a result of
the Alien Registration Act of 1940.3 7 Furthermore, an act based
on these criteria would serve little purpose since (1) the United
States already has the right to restrict the movements of criminals,38
and (2) the, act would be so detailed that it would be easy for
subversives to escape the restrictions of its provisions.89
As it is now impossible to restrict any one particular group's
right to travel, it would seem that the State Department would
be limited to passport and travel restrictions based on geographical
factors.40  Two recent district court cases have held this test up
for judicial scrutiny. In Zemel v. Rusk,41 the plaintiff wished to
have his passport validated for travel to Cuba. The State Depart-
ment refused his request stating that only those individuals whose
travel might be in the best interest of the United States, such
as newsmen, would be permitted to travel to Cuba. The district
court upheld the Secretary's determination, reasoning that the
President has the power to restrict passports in national emergencies
as part of his power to conduct our foreign relations. The
Executive has the right to take all steps necessary, except war,
to protect the rights of American citizens in foreign countries. 42
In MacEwan v. Rusk,4 3 the plaintiffs sought an injunction restrain-
ing the Secretary of State from refusing to endorse their passports
for travel to Cuba. The district court upheld the Government's
right to impose geographic restrictions upon travel under the
executive authority to conduct foreign affairs.
These cases are factually distinguishable from both Kent and
Aptheker. Also the controlling legal issues are of a different
nature.
Both Kent and Aptheker concerned restrictions placed on in-
dividuals or groups because of their political beliefs or associations.
386 S. Doc. No. 126, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1958).
372 U.S. CODE CONG. SERv. 3887 (1950).
38 3 MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST § 512, at 920 (1906).
39 See 2 U.S. CODE CONG. SERv. 3887 (1950); 1 U.S. CODE CONG. StaV.
1392 (1950).4 0 Boudin, The Constitutional Right To Travel, 56 CoLum. L. Rzv. 47, 74
(1956).
41228 F. Supp. 65 (D. Conn.), cert. granted, - U.S. - (1964).
42 Rev. Stat. § 2001 (1875), 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (1958).
43 228 F. Supp. 306 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
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In Zemel the entire citizenry is restricted in the exercise of their
right to travel. The prohibition does not depend on either "beliefs
or associations; rather it depends on geography.
The Kent case concerned the discretion of the Secretary of
State and Aptheker concerned the powers of Congress to restrict
foreign travel. However, in Zemel the court was primarily con-
cerned with the inherent power of the President to restrict travel
as a necessary part of his constitutional duty to control foreign
relations.
In considering whether such a determination by the President
is valid, the Court must consider two main questions.
First, is this a "political question," and therefore not a jus-
ticiable issue? A "political question" has been defined as one
which has
a textually demonstratable [sic] constitutional commitment of an issue to a
coordinate political department; or a lack of a judicially discoverable and
manageable standard for resolving it . . . or the impossibility of a
court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of respect
due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for un-
questioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality
of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments
on one question. 44
It would seem that this may well be within this definition. If
it is so held then the restrictions based on geographical restrictions
will be allowed to stand.
Secondly, if it is determined that the validity of this order
of the President is not a "political question" and therefore subject
to judicial review, the Court will then determine its reasonableness.
In cases involving personal liberties the Court has the power to
insure that neither the executive nor the legislature act arbitrarily."4
In testing the reasonableness of a geographic restriction
applying to all the people the Court will have to weigh the
nation's right to news with the immediacy of the threat to our
national security created by unrestricted foreign travel.
Even though the restriction under discussion in Zemel does
not apply to all newspapermen, it would seem there is some
danger in allowing the President to pick the reporters he considers
reputable or worthy of this privilege. Notwithstanding that there
is a precedent for such privilege-granting," this power in the
44 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1961).
45Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 58-59 (1958). Mr. Chief Justice
Warren feels that this is an affirmative duty. Id. at 78 (dissenting opinion).
Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas feel that the first amendment
freedoms are absolute and not subject to any restrictions. Id. at 84(dissenting opinion).
46 Worthy v. Herder, 270 F2d 905 (D.C. Cir. 1959). Thirty-one repre-
sentatives of the news gathering agencies were granted passports for Red
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hands of one man, even the President, is very close to govern-
mental censorship of the news and may well be an unconstitutional
limitation on the freedoms of speech and press.
On the other hand, the present state of our relations with
Cuba is so delicate that it may be in the national interest that such
a restriction be sustained, especially since provision is made for at
least a few exceptions and is, hopefully, a temporary measure.
A
CRIMINAL LAW - NEW YORK PROCEDURE TO DETERMINE
VOLUNTARINESS OF A CONFESSION RULED INVALID. - Petitioner
was convicted of murder in the first degree in a trial during
which the judge submitted to the same jury both the questions
of guilt and the voluntariness of his confession in accordance with
New York procedure. The conviction was affirmed by the New
York Court of Appeals and thereafter Jackson filed a petition for
habeas corpus in the federal district court, alleging the uncon-
stitutionality of the New York procedure. After both the district
court and the court of appeals affirmed the conviction, the United
States Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the
New York procedure violated the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment by denying defendant's right to a fair and
separate determination of the voluntariness of his confession.
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
Under common law a confession, when "not the product of
any meaningful act of volition" I on the part of the accused, was
held inadmissible as evidence in criminal trials since there was a
judicial belief in its probable falsity. 2 This rule of evidence, some-
times enacted into state law,3 caused some state courts to exclude
coerced confessions without relying on the constitutional principles
of due process of law.
Although the passage of the fourteenth amendment in 1868
applied the concept of due process to the states, no case involving
a state conviction based on an allegedly involuntary confession
reached the United States Supreme Court until 1936 in Brozwn
China. N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1959, p. 29, col. 1. It would seem that since
Mr. Worthy was not among these representatives his travel to Cuba would
be "unsafe."
I Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 211 (1960).
23 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § 822 (3d ed. 1940).
s See, e.g., N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 395; TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. art
727 (1907).
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